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Abstract: The Ghost of Clytemnestra is the first afterlife figure in extant Greek 
literature to call for vengeance instead of ritual burial. She goads the Erinyes to 
kill Orestes in order to rectify the wrongs she has suffered. Yet the living Clytem-
nestra has already proven manipulative, politically usurping, and murderous; her 
Ghost attacks her own son. Further, the Ghost’s lack of substance (as eido\lon, 
psyche\, or onar) distances her from the living world. On what ethical grounds, 
then, does the Ghost base her claims? How can a character so far beyond the 
boundaries of societal norms demand serious ethical consideration?
I. INTRODUCTION: CLYTEMNESTRA’S  
REAPPEARANCE AND ETHICAL APPEALS
At the end of the Choephoroi  Orestes kills his mother, Clytemnestra, 
and displays her corpse to humans, gods, and the theatrical audience as 
proof of his just vengeance (Ch. 973–1006). In an eerie reversal at the start 
of the Eumenides, Clytemnestra reappears onstage, bearing the wounds of 
her murder, to demand vengeance against Orestes. Like the living queen, 
the Ghost of Clytemnestra marshals rhetoric to effect action in the world, 
rousing the sleeping Erinyes as her proxies by reciting a multitude of 
wrongs concerning her dishonor and suffering (Eu. 94–139).1 The Ghost 
1 The “Ghost of Clytemnestra” (shortened to “Clytemnestra” or “the Ghost” when 
the context is clear) refers to this figure for consistency, although this is not the term used 
in the Greek text, on which see (Section II) below. 
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2 There is a surprising paucity of scholarship on the Ghost of Clytemnestra. The most 
influential analyses of Clytemnestra pay the Ghost and her particular issues little or no 
attention, e.g., Betensky 1978, Rabinowitz 1981, Vellacott 1984b, Goldhill 1984, Neuburg 
1991, McClure 1999, Foley 2001, and Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012. Winnington-Ingram 1948, 
141, may provide a clue to the neglect: “Clytemnestra has a speaking part in the Eumen-
ides also, but the short scene in which her ghost upbraids the sleeping Furies tells us little 
about Clytemnestra living.” 
3 On Greek tragic audiences, collective and individual, responding to ethical issues 
in tragedy, see Segal 1996 and Easterling 1996.
4 Clytemnestra loses the agon with Orestes physically and this, momentarily, seems 
proof of the triumph of his arguments (Ch. 894–930), see Foley 2001, 230–2.
5 Bacon 2001, 48–57; Winnington-Ingram 1948; and Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012, 309–27. 
thus extends Clytemnestra’s character and claims beyond the presumed 
closure of her life. 
Yet so much interferes with audience members, readers, and scholars 
heeding her arguments:2 first is her identity, for the figure onstage is the 
afterlife remnant of the deceptive queen who turned on her husband, 
children, and state, and whose killing Apollo himself had sanctioned. Audi-
ences may be inclined to dismiss her claims as unworthy of consideration,3 
for they belong to an irredeemably villainous character who has been 
condemned by an oracle and whose murder furnishes the plot of the 
Choephoroi.4 By contrast, within the Eumenides her claims are treated 
seriously: the Erinyes take up Clytemnestra’s claims for vengeance in 
their pursuit of Orestes. They subsume her position into their more 
general ethical imperative by insisting that retribution for kin-murder is 
a pillar of justice and that letting Orestes go unpunished threatens the 
order of mankind. As the Eumenides progresses, though, Clytemnestra’s 
stage presence and arguments fade: while Orestes remains onstage with 
his divine champion, Apollo, the Ghost of Clytemnestra disappears. The 
Erinyes’ universal arguments during Orestes’ trial no longer resonate 
with Clytemnestra’s personality or claims.5 When the Erinyes succumb 
to Athena’s new justice, accept a place of honor in Athens, and release 
Orestes, they ignore the consequences for the very one who invoked 
them. No voice speaks for Clytemnestra. 
Returning critical attention to the Ghost of Clytemnestra will dem-
onstrate that dismissing her based on these two (contradictory) reasons 
misses the compelling ethical challenges she poses. The ominous, inventive 
Clytemnestra returns from the dead precisely to defy the quashing of 
individual claims based on a notion of the larger social order, even one 
that is divinely supported. Her Ghost’s continuing demand for vengeance, 
moreover, extends the salience of ethical questions past the endpoint of 
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6 Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012, 308, puts this forth as a general, unanswered question: 
“Kann sie in diesem letzten Auftritt noch als menschliches Selbst beurteilt werden oder ist 
ihre Individualität als Lebende nun als tote Schattenfigur aufgehoben?”
7 All citations follow the OCT (Aeschylus, Page 1973; Il., Monro and Allen 1920; and 
Od., Allen 1917). All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own. 
life. She invokes her individual honor after death and hints at an under-
world society, both notions that the political finale of the trilogy fails to 
address. This article, consequently, focuses on the manifold provocations 
against normative values specific to the status and claims of the Ghost 
of Clytemnestra. 
A recurrent structure is necessary to dissect her fraught and the-
matically interconnected rhetoric. What is the Ghost’s relation on the one 
hand to the living Clytemnestra and on the other to the afterlife from 
which she emerges?6 A close reading of the Ghost passage uncovers a 
set of linguistic and ideational problems in her speech, which provides a 
framework for further analysis. Two brief sections follow to contextualize 
the main arguments: The first introduces the ethical issues presented in 
this article. The second sketches Greek cultural perceptions of the dead 
and afterlife figures, and addresses the two most relevant literary precur-
sors, the Homeric ghosts who make demands on the living (Patroclus 
in Iliad 23 and Elpenor in Odyssey 11). The analysis then revisits the 
question of the Ghost’s status in the afterlife, interweaving it with how 
she constructs her arguments. The first thematic section contrasts the 
two Homeric ghosts, who seek burial, with revenant Clytemnestra’s call 
for vengeance. The next section addresses the Ghost’s description of her 
disgraced afterlife, which she twists into an argument for the Erinyes’ 
intervention in the living world. The last section focuses on the stakes 
of her ethical claims. It contrasts these with key scenes from Aeschylean 
drama, especially other ghosts in the Oresteia and the Ghost of Darius 
in the Persians. The conclusion elucidates the extraordinary challenges 
to ethical thought posed by the indomitable specter of Clytemnestra. 
II. THE RHETORIC AND THEMES OF THE GHOST’S CLAIMS
The Ghost of Clytemnestra affects the living world through her language 
alone; she invokes demonic agents rather than herself attacking or 
haunting Orestes. The rhetorical claims she uses to activate the Erinyes 
must first be unpacked sequentially since she reinforces them through 
repetition and shifts the meanings of her terms over the course of the 
speech (Eu. 94–103):7 
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8 Laurentianus XXXII 9, labeled Mediceus (M) by Page 1973. The manuscript stage 
directions refer to the Ghost of Darius in the Persians as an εἴδωλον as well, which may 
indicate a later convention. Since, however, εἴδωλον is not how the characters refer to these 
figures it provides a textual starting point for examining the terminology actually used. 
9 Vernant 1991, 186–8, defines three kinds of supernatural apparition denoted in 
Homer by the term εἴδωλον, all of which are actual doubles of a human being, rather than 
products of the imagination: the phantom, phasma, created by a god in the semblance of a 
living person; the dream, oneiros, considered to be a sleep apparition sent by the gods as 
an image of a real being; and the souls of the dead, eido\la kamonto\n, phantoms or images 
Κλυταιμήστρας Εἴδωλον
εὕδοιτ᾽ ἄν, ὠή· καὶ καθευδουσῶν τί δεῖ; 
ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ὧδ᾽ ἀπητιμασμένη  95
ἄλλοισιν ἐν νεκροῖσιν, ὧν μὲν ἔκτανον 
ὄνειδος ἐν φθιτοῖσιν οὐκ ἐκλείπεται, 
αἰσχρῶς δ᾽ ἀλῶμαι. προυννέπω δ᾽ ὑμῖν ὅτι 
ἔχω μεγίστην αἰτίαν κείνων ὕπο. 
παθοῦσα δ᾽ οὕτω δεινὰ πρὸς τῶν φιλτάτων, 100 
οὐδεὶς ὑπέρ μου δαιμόνων μηνίεται, 
κατασφαγείσης πρὸς χερῶν μητροκτόνων. 
ὅρα δὲ πληγὰς τάσδε καρδίᾳ σέθεν·  
The Eido\lon of Clytemnestra
You would be asleep! Hey! And what use are you sleeping?
I, thanks to you, having been dishonored thus  95
among the other dead—the reproach of those I killed
never ceases among the perished
and shamefully I wander. And I proclaim to you that 
I am blamed the most by them. 
Having thus suffered appalling things at the hands 
of my nearest kin, 100
not one of the divinities is wrathful on my behalf,
although I have been slaughtered by matricidal hands. 
See these wounds in your heart!
Even from the first two words of the transmitted Greek text an important 
issue ought to provoke scrutiny of Clytemnestra’s status: it is uncertain 
how to name the figure onstage. Although scholars frequently refer to 
this character as “the Ghost of Clytemnestra,” the text does not: of the 
available terms in Greek for soul, phantom, or dream, the primary medi-
eval manuscript labels the character Κλυταιμήστρας Εἴδωλον, “the image 
of Clytemnestra.”8 The term εἴδωλον is common in Homer, in conjunction 
with other terms for the dead.9 It occurs, however, only three times in the 
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of the dead, which exist in the afterlife and are called psychai as well; cf. Rohde 1925, 3–26 
and 156–235; Vermeule 1979, 8; and Burkert 1985, 190–8.
10 In the Ag. εἴδωλον is used metaphorically to describe social relations as “the image 
of a shadow.” The other Aeschylean uses are not decisive: one is attested in a fragmentary 
satyr play (Radt, 78a, 6). The other is at Pr. 568, where Io uses it to refer to either an image 
or phantom of the dead Argos haunting her as a gadfly, although Sommerstein 2008a, fol-
lowing M. Schmidt, excises the phrase that includes εἴδωλον. 
11 While the precise staging of the character is unknown, the situation is clear. On 
Clytemnestra’s appearance and the debate over her staging, including whether she was 
staged at all, see Sommerstein 1989, 100–1, n. 94–139, and 102, n. 103.
12 Clytemnestra’s Ghost is occasionally described tout court as an Erinys (Rabinowitz 
1981, 170) or as their leader (Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012, 308; and cf. Anderson 1932, 313–19).
13 Clytemnestra in the Ag. stops just short of calling herself an Erinys, although she 
invokes Justice, Ruin, and the Erinys (Ἐρινύν, Ag. 1433) who was her helper, and later claims 
to herself be the “ancient, bitter avenging spirit” (ἀλάστωρ, Ag. 1501) of the house, a claim 
the Chorus dispute (Ag. 1505–8); see Foley 2001, 211–34, arguing against Neuburg 1991.
text of Aeschylus, only once in the Oresteia (Ag. 839), and not at all in this 
scene.10 What then, is the proper term for this reappearance of Clytemnes-
tra, instead of “image”? The ancient label (εἴδωλον) suggests the effective-
ness of the dramatic delay before she announces her name and that she 
is appearing in a dream (ὄναρ) at verse 116. This is more than 20 verses 
after she begins speaking. Up until that point the audience is necessarily 
unclear about her state: Is she a ghost able to act in the world? Is she a 
powerless image whose words will go unheeded? The cryptic beginning 
to the scene should not be ignored on its own terms. Uncertainty at the 
start as to the status and power of the Ghost is a component of the scene’s 
aesthetics and the background for her polysemous rhetoric. 
From her opening words and appearance among the snoring Erinyes, 
it is evident that the Ghost of Clytemnestra’s primary dramatic function 
is to wake them.11 The scene revolves around this function: she chastises 
them for sleeping (Eu. 94), continues her reproaches as they snore 
(118–39), and disappears forever when they awaken (140). The revenant 
Clytemnestra is, however, much more than a fantastic alarm clock for the 
Erinyes. In their chase and prosecution of Orestes they are her surrogates 
in the living world, since she appears powerless over human beings. Yet it 
is crucial to distinguish her from them, due to the claim sometimes made 
that she is an Erinys herself, or their master.12 This would overemphasize 
her supernatural status and assimilate her arguments to theirs.13 Although 
she lets loose these “hounds of vengeance” (e.g., Ch. 924), she does not 
control them, as is seen by their eventual renunciation of her cause. She 
is still the remnant of a human being, now limited in her effect on the 
physical and demonic world to persuasive words alone. 
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14 On the staging of the corpses of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, see Garvie 1986, lii–liii.
The humanity of the Ghost of Clytemnestra underlies several of 
her claims to vengeance. The first is her assertion of the Erinyes’ trans-
gression against her honor (Eu. 95–6): “I, thanks to you, having been 
dishonored (ἀπητιμασμένη) thus among the other dead.” The Ghost of 
Clytemnestra appropriates ideas of honor and dishonor from the living 
world and applies them to a general conglomeration of the dead (ἄλλοισιν 
ἐν νεκροῖσιν, “among the other dead,” 96; and ἐν φθιτοῖσιν, “among the 
perished,” 97). Within this group she specifies that those she killed (ὧν . . . 
ἔκτανον, 96) maintain persistant and damaging accusations against her. 
She reinforces the notion of continuing social relationships by referring to 
blame (ὄνειδος, 97; cf. ὀνείδεσιν, 135) and shame (αἰσχρῶς, 98). Neverthe-
less, she does not take responsibility for the causes of her dishonor, but 
uses it to chastise the Erinyes. She continues to build up foundations for 
her—still unstated—claims with the allegation that none of the divinities 
care about a mother slain by her own child (πρὸς χερῶν μητροκτόνων, 
102). Clytemnestra thus embeds her afterlife dishonor, shame, and blame 
within the framework of social and kinship bonds.
The connection with her previously living body enables the Ghost 
to focus attention on her wounds (πληγὰς τάσδε, 103) as marks of the 
crime against her. When rolled onstage in the previous play, her corpse 
might have been clothed in this same bloody costume (Ch. 973–1006). 
In that case the wounds would have represented the results of offstage 
violence.14 Their appearance on the Ghost of Clytemnestra, however, 
now compels questions about their physical status: in what way, precisely, 
are these “wounds”? Are they marks visible on her corpse, or image, or 
costume? The phrase “see these wounds in your heart” (ὅρα δὲ πληγὰς 
τάσδε καρδίᾳ σέθεν), moreover, exposes the problems that physical vision 
presents when applied to supernatural viewers and a spectral object. Does 
the Ghost intend for the Erinyes to see the wounds in their sleep, when 
they still seem unaware of her, or when awake? The Ghost’s language and 
her liminal status involve issues of corporality and spectatorship, which 
complicate the claim for vengeance that she derives from her wounds. 
While appealing to divinities to requite sacrifice is standard in Greek 
ritual, the Ghost of Clytemnestra here incites the Erinyes to chase Orestes 
by a shaming procedure (Eu. 106–16):
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15 I exclude the deeply suspect verses, 104–5; cf. West 1990 and Sommerstein 1989, 
ad loc. 
16 The goddesses are underworld divinities (κατὰ χθονὸς θεαί, 115), while the sacrifices 
are at night (108), “at an hour shared by none of the gods” (109). Compare her sacrificial 
language at Ag. 1384–98 and see Rynearson 2013, 10–11; and Zeitlin 1965, 474–83.
ἦ πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐλείξατε,15 
χοάς τ᾽ ἀοίνους, νηφάλια μειλίγματα, 
καὶ νυκτίσεμνα δεῖπν᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάρᾳ πυρὸς 
ἔθυον, ὥραν οὐδενὸς κοινὴν θεῶν· 
καὶ πάντα ταῦτα λὰξ ὁρῶ πατούμενα, 110
ὁ δ᾽ ἐξαλύξας οἴχεται νεβροῦ δίκην, 
καὶ ταῦτα κούφως ἐκ μέσων ἀρκυστάτων 
ὤρουσεν, ὑμῖν ἐγκατιλλώψας μέγα. 
ἀκούσαθ᾽ ὡς ἔλεξα τῆς ἐμῆς περὶ 
ψυχῆς· φρονήσατ᾽, ὦ κατὰ χθονὸς θεαί.  115
ὄναρ γὰρ ὑμᾶς νῦν Κλυταιμήστρα καλῶ. 
Surely you have lapped up many things of mine indeed:
wineless drink offerings, sacred appeasements,
and night-holy meals over a hearth of fire 
I sacrificed, at an hour shared by none of the gods.
And all these things I see trampled underfoot,  110
and he has gone, escaped just as a fawn,  
and what’s more, lightly from the midst of nets 
he darted, greatly mocking you with squinting eyes. 
Hear me, as I have spoken for my very 
soul! Mind it, O underworld goddesses, 115
for in a dream, I, Clytemnestra, now call you! 
The Ghost uses deliberately unsolemn vocabulary (ἐλείξατε, “you have 
lapped up,” 106; and λὰξ . . . πατούμενα, “trampled underfoot,” 110), mixed 
with sacred language (ἔθυον, “I sacrificed;” and νυκτίσεμνα “night-holy,” 
108). This verbally reproduces the Erinyes’ double nature, as both demons 
enforcing gruesome punishments (Eu. 70–2, 186–97, and 385–8) and holy, 
ancient divinities (393–6). The sacrifices, chthonic in nature, ought to refer 
to those meant to ensure Clytemnestra’s vengeance against Agamemnon.16 
Yet the Ghost of Clytemnestra now seems to regard her previous sac-
rifices as having created a general obligation for the Erinyes to support 
her, which she turns against her son. Their failure to fulfill their duty 
reemphasizes her earlier criticism of the shortfall in divine concern (101). 
This disrespect is evident in the Ghost’s accusation that the underworld 
goddesses themselves are trampling on sacred ritual (110). The metaphor 
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17 Agamemnon trod on the sacred fabrics (Ag. 904–74) and Cassandra stripped herself 
and trampled on the sacred robes that marked her as Apollo’s prophet (Ag. 1264–70); cf. 
Sider 1978, 15–17. 
18 Sommerstein 1989, ad loc. Cf. Chantraine 1968–80 and Beekes and Beek 2010 on 
the ocular associations of ἰλλός in addition to the ὀπ- root (under ὄπωπα).
19 This is the adverbial use of ὄναρ, “in a dream,” (cf. Eu. 131, below) as Smyth 1926; 
the LSJ, 2.II; and Sommerstein 1989 translate. There are those who translate ὄναρ apposi-
tively, “as a dream” (cf. Ag. 82), e.g., Podlecki 1989 and see Goldhill 1984, 215.
reverses the previous instances of trampling in the trilogy, in which humans 
debased items belonging to the gods.17 Honor and dishonor are at stake 
as well in Orestes’ “mocking” the Erinyes (ὑμῖν ἐγκατιλλώψας μέγα, 113) 
and thus disrespecting Clytemnestra as well. 
The previous references to vision become a marked motif of 
the Ghost’s speech in this passage: the unusual verb for mocking 
(ἐγκατιλλώψας), has squinting (ἰλλός) and seeing (ὀπ-) roots.18 It reinforces 
the unusual but only subtly marked synesthesia of seeing in one’s heart 
(ὅρα . . . καρδίᾳ, 103) and connects with the Ghost metaphorically seeing 
(ὁρῶ, 110) her sacrifices trampled underfoot. This motif intensifies in the 
climactic verse 116, as the Ghost of Clytemnestra signals via the word ὄναρ 
that she herself knows that she is in a dream of the Erinyes.19 “Dream” 
finally answers the question of how to label this iteration of Clytemnes-
tra’s stage character. It also opens the door to comparisons—within the 
Oresteia and with other texts—between dreams, images, and ghosts. 
Speaking for herself is vitally important for the Ghost of Clytem-
nestra, since her only advocates are temporarily incapacitated. It also 
differentiates her from other undead mentioned in the Oresteia. Char-
acteristically, Clytemnestra’s words become potent speech acts: in the 
three verses that begin to disturb the Erinyes she calls on them to listen 
(ἀκούσαθ᾽, 114) and pay heed (φρονήσατ᾽, 115), and emphasizes her own 
speaking (ἔλεξα, 114) and calling (καλῶ, 116). That she has spoken on 
behalf of her own psyche\ (ἔλεξα τῆς ἐμῆς περὶ ψυχῆς, 114–15) marks the 
stakes of her ethical claims, yet is also a deeply ambiguous reference: is 
the psyche\ her life, her image onstage, her disembodied soul in Hades, or 
a combination of these? Each possibility has different implications for the 
grounding of her claims and the consequences of completed vengeance 
for her continued existence.
Although presumably the audience could easily intuit the identity 
of the figure onstage through her costume and speech before verse 116, 
the Ghost of Clytemnestra’s dramatic announcement of her own name 
(Κλυταιμήστρα) builds on the status she held in life as a queen and the 
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20 OCT desperatus. 
power she has exerted as the central manipulator in the first play and 
the object of vengeance in the second. Her high status, in turn, grounds 
the dishonor she claims to suffer in the afterlife (95). Clytemnestra’s 
name couples with and reinforces her invocation (ὑμᾶς . . . καλῶ, 116) of 
the Erinyes, in the final position in this speech, just before they begin to 
whine. But her self-naming moment foregrounds an ethical problem as 
well, that of continuity between her living character, the inanimate corpse 
onstage in the previous play, and her reanimated, speaking figure. The 
issue raised by the “I” who makes claims and its relation to the living or 
dead world is one that requires precise parsing. 
As the previously silent Erinyes start moaning onstage—demonstrat-
ing already the efficacy of the Ghost’s language—she continues to urge 
them on (Eu. 117–28): 
Χο. (μυγμός)
Κλ. μύζοιτ᾽ ἄν· ἁνὴρ δ᾽ οἴχεται φεύγων πρόσω· 
†φίλοις γάρ εἰσιν οὐκ ἐμοῖς† προσίκτορες.20 
Χο. (μυγμός) 120
Κλ. ἄγαν ὑπνώσσεις, κοὐ κατοικτίζεις πάθος· 
φονεὺς δ᾽ Ὀρέστης τῆσδε μητρὸς οἴχεται. 
Χο. (ὠγμός)
Κλ. ὤζεις, ὑπνώσσεις· οὐκ ἀναστήσῃ τάχος; 
τί σοι πέπρωται πρᾶγμα πλὴν τεύχειν κακά;  125
Χο. (ὠγμός)
Κλ. ὕπνος πόνος τε κύριοι συνωμόται 
δεινῆς δρακαίνης ἐξεκήραναν μένος. 
Chorus: (whine)
Clyt.: You would be snoring! But the man has gone, fleeing far;
[For suppliants are not devoid of friends.]
Chorus: (whine) 120
Clyt.: You are too drowsy, and you do not show compassion 
for suffering;
But Orestes, the murderer of this mother, has gone.
Chorus: (moan)
Clyt.: You moan, you drowse—will you not quickly get up?
What affairs have been assigned to you except to 
produce bad things? 125
Chorus: (moan)
Clyt.: Sleep and toil, powerful conspirators,
have drained the terrible serpent of wrath.
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21 On Clytemnestra’s telos prayer or binding song in Ag. 958–74, see McClure 1996. 
Note the Erinyes’ verbatim repetition of long stanzas, Eu. 778–92 = 808–22 and 837–46 = 
870–80 (the line numbers do not correspond in the OCT); cf. Rosenmeyer 1982, 284–310 
and 343.
22 On Orestes as fulfiller of the snake prophecy, see Rabinowitz 1981, 168; and 
Roberts 1985, 283–97.
23 Lebeck 1971, 14; and Rabinowitz 1981, 168–72.
The Ghost attempts to invoke the Erinyes’ pity (κοὐ κατοικτίζεις πάθος, 
121), a somewhat ironic move thanks to her nearly simultaneous appeal 
to their evil function (125). The pathos (πάθος, 121) she describes doubles 
her previous reference to suffering (παθοῦσα, 100), although it remains 
unspecified if this pain stems from the original betrayal by Agamemnon, 
being killed by Orestes, being hounded by the dead in the afterlife, or all 
three. She specifically emphasizes that Orestes murdered her as his mother 
(φονεὺς . . . τῆσδε μητρός, 122), cycling back to her mention of “matricidal 
hands” (χερῶν μητροκτόνων, 102). The rhetorical recurrence to previous 
themes and language links the Ghost both to the living Clytemnestra’s 
incantatory rhetorical technique and to the Erinyes’ repetitively binding 
dance and obsessive harping on their dishonor.21 The deictic in the phrase 
“this mother” (τῆσδε μητρός, 122) also moves the frame of reference to 
her non-dream self, since it refers to the biological mother that she was 
when living. Like the deictic in “these wounds” (πληγὰς τάσδε, 103), it 
represents a facet of the vacillation of frames of reference between the 
presence of the one who was wronged and the absence inherent in her 
appearing in a dream and not having a biological body. Moreover, it 
continues the ethical problem surrounding Clytemnestra’s motherhood 
from the Choephoroi. What do the types of distance from the living world 
that Clytemnestra’s death, appearance in a dream, and continuing abdi-
cation of her ethical accountability as a mother do to her own language 
of presence and obligation? 
Although she is decidedly human, many references within this 
speech yoke Clytemnestra thematically to the Erinyes. In the Choephoroi 
Clytemnestra had a snake dream that linked the dead Agamemnon as 
chthonic dream-sender to Orestes as dream-interpreter and fulfiller (Ch. 
523–50).22 In this Eumenides passage, Clytemnestra is the dream (116) and 
describes her avengers as a snake (δεινῆς δρακαίνης, 128), tethering their 
chthonic state to her own.23 She urges them to perform their assigned office 
or duty (πέπρωται πρᾶγμα . . . τεύχειν κακά, 125)—the verbs do the work 
here, indicating that the Erinyes have a specific, unchangeable function to 
which she appeals. This raises the question of how Clytemnestra’s claims 
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relate to the transformation of the Erinyes’ avenging, outsider position 
in the old law to a cherished, insider one under the new law. If they can 
move from murderous, polluted, and dishonored figures to honored ones, 
why is Clytemnestra never given the opportunity?
As the Erinyes begin to awaken, the Ghost’s final lines focus atten-
tion on their dreaming, and thus on her own status (Eu. 129–39):
Χο. (μυγμὸς διπλοῦς ὀξύς) 
λαβὲ λαβὲ λαβὲ λαβέ· φράζου.  130
Κλ. ὄναρ διώκεις θῆρα, κλαγγαίνεις δ᾽ ἅπερ 
κύων μέριμναν οὔποτ᾽ ἐκλείπων φόνου. 
τί δρᾷς; ἀνίστω· μή σε νικάτω πόνος, 
μηδ᾽ ἀγνοήσῃς πῆμα μαλθαχθεῖσ᾽ ὕπνῳ. 
ἄλγησον ἧπαρ ἐνδίκοις ὀνείδεσιν· 135
τοῖς σώφροσιν γὰρ ἀντίκεντρα γίγνεται. 
σὺ δ᾽ αἱματηρὸν πνεῦμ᾽ ἐπουρίσασα τῷ, 
ἀτμῷ κατισχναίνουσα, νηδύος πυρί, 
ἕπου, μάραινε δευτέροις διώγμασιν.
Chorus: (sharp double whine)
Get him! Get him! Get him! Get him! Look there!  130
Clyt.: You are pursuing a beast in a dream, and you bellow  
like a dog never abandoning concern for gore.
What are you doing? Get up! Do not let toil conquer you,
nor, soothed by sleep, ignore pains.
Feel a stab of pain in your liver from just reproaches; 135
to the wise they are like goads.
But you, send after him bloody breath,
waste him away with fumes, with fire from your insides,
follow him! Waste him away with a second pursuit! 
This interplay between what the theatrical audience sees in the dramatic 
frame and “dream” is already present with the Erinyes’ first articulate 
words. These indicate that they believe they are actually pursuing Orestes, 
even mimicking the chase (λαβὲ λαβὲ λαβὲ λαβέ, 130), while they are still 
lying asleep onstage. One can almost hear the disgust in Clytemnestra’s 
line, “what are you doing? Get up!” (τί δρᾷς; ἀνίστω, 133) The Erinyes’ 
φράζου (“look there!” 130) is a deictic indicator that picks up on and 
complicates the present-absent dynamic and visual themes of the Ghost’s 
language, since they are pointing out an unseen Orestes as if he were 
visible to them. When the Ghost complains that they are pursuing a wild 
beast within one dream (ὄναρ διώκεις θῆρα, 131) from which she, another 
dream (ὄναρ, 116), is trying to wake them, she indicates to the audience 
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24 Throughout the rest of the Eu. they are described with the language of interior 
organs, which connects in part to their blood-slurping animality and in part to the pains 
they feel when confronted first by Clytemnestra and then Athena, e.g., Eu. 158–9, 248–9, 
264–6, 782 = 812, 840–2 = 873–5. 
that two dreams are occurring simultaneously. Moreover, she is exhibiting 
a remarkable degree of self-awareness concerning her status within this 
doubly problematic dream-state.
When they do awaken, the Erinyes refer to Clytemnestra as the 
“reproach from dreams” (ὄνειδος ἐξ ὀνειράτων, 155), which sums up the 
Ghost’s effective goading in one condensed expression. The strong asso-
nance of the phrase draws attention to Clytemnestra’s own use of these 
terms (ὄναρ, 116 and 131; ὄνειδος, 97). Their use of the plural, “dreams” 
(155) has multiple possible referents: it could simply stand for the singular, 
could refer to dreams each Erinys was seeing, or could refer to the double 
dream of Orestes escaping and Clytemnestra chastising. As we will see 
below, the layered and uncertain references to dreams and their link to 
reality is in line with other passages in the Oresteia. It is less possible to 
untangle them, I will argue, than to recognize that they double the Ghost’s 
problematic physical state and draw attention to her tenuous arguments. 
The dynamics of Clytemnestra’s body play out inversely to the 
Erinyes’ embodiment. They were only abstract references in the Agamem-
non and invisible in the Choephoroi. Their embodiment is a central theme 
in the Eumenides, and its effects manifest themselves in this Ghost passage, 
where they are both visible for the first time and temporarily prevented 
from fulfilling their function. Sleep is not only a physical impediment, 
but, the Ghost warns, its mollifying quality could also undermine their 
obligations: “nor, soothed by sleep, ignore pains” (134). These pains are 
either hers (again appealing to her sufferings in life or in the underworld) 
or their own, since she hurts the Erinyes by means of goading accusa-
tions (135–6). Their possible softening and pain derive from the fact 
that the Erinyes are now staged; their avatars give physical referents to 
otherwise metaphorical language. This is especially true in the mixture 
of non-physical ideas with body parts in the command to “feel a stab of 
pain in your liver from just reproaches” (ἄλγησον ἧπαρ ἐνδίκοις ὀνείδεσιν, 
135), and is possibly behind the references to “fumes” and “fire from your 
insides” (138–9), as well as “seeing in the heart” (103).24 Their physical 
presence, speech, and insistence on their rights are the foundation for 
the appeasement through persuasion and honors that Athena initiates. 
The Erinyes themselves at one point also declare a surprisingly middle-
path attitude in an often-quoted passage (Eu. 526–30), and at the end, 
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25 This is not to ignore Porter 1990, who rightly warns against the dangers of inter-
preting early cruxes in the Or. by reference to later passages. The intention is not to claim 
clarity, only draw attention to a larger structural pattern. 
26 Foley 2001, 202–3 and n. 3, emphasizes the serious ethical responsibility of ven-
geance as the background for living Clytemnestra’s claims. She cites the emphasis on 
Orestes’ deliberation in the Ch. as evidence that vengeance is presented as a grave ethical 
issue; cf. Vellacott 1984b, 63–75. 
27 Zeitlin 1965, 482–3, examines how Clytemnestra is first justified in avenging her lost 
child and then loses that justification, in part through the predatory behavior against her own 
children. On the changing meanings of human and divine justice in the Or., see, e.g., Kitto 
1961, esp. 90–5; Gagarin 1976, 66–73; Goldhill 1986, 35–9; and Sommerstein 2010, 193–202.
28 Her ethical claims could also be termed “moral” since they are a culturally 
 contingent—but still general—prescription of what agents “must” or “ought” to do. For 
this way of framing the term “moral,” see Harpham 1992, 3. Annas 1992 summarizes the 
differences between ancient ways of writing about ethics and modern ways of thinking about 
“morals,” as well as the lack of general agreement as to what differentiates these terms.
of course, add positive blessings to their functions. These aspects of their 
later character might then connect to the bizarre non sequitur in this 
passage, when the Ghost avers that reproaches are goads for the wise or 
moderate (σώφροσιν, 136).25 Either adjective seems entirely out of place 
as a possible description of the Erinyes in this scene. The irony is all the 
more apparent as the Ghost of Clytemnestra is in the midst of urging 
them to shrivel her son up with bloody breath (137). The incongruity in 
Clytemnestra’s speech serves as a brief hint of things to come, but also 
differentiates the Erinyes from her, the one who is never appeased. 
III. ETHICAL APPROACHES
The Ghost demands blood-for-blood vengeance, in line with the living 
Clytemnestra’s justification after her murder of Agamemnon. To interpret 
the substance and dynamics of her pleas, it is crucial to conceptualize them 
in ethical terms.26 Despite the paranormal circumstances, the Ghost builds 
her claims on human foundations: shame, personal honor, motherhood, 
and divine wrath for familial crime, all of which are imbricated with the 
ethical concerns of the trilogy.27 An audience attentive to the perspectives 
and claims of characters in the play ought—when these touch on social 
norms and ethical matters—to consider her case. 
How does one locate the Ghost’s arguments in ethical (or moral) 
frameworks?28 In terms of scope, discussion of ethical issues in literature 
may attempt an interpretation on a range of scales: from a whole genre 
(such as “tragedy”), to that of an author or work (e.g., assessing the 
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29 On tragic character, see Gill 1990, and 1996; and Lawrence 2013, esp. 15–18.
30 See Easterling 1990, 83–92, on disagreements concerning the nature of dramatic 
characters and on the different levels of interpretive codes audiences use to understand 
performances. 
31 Altieri 1998, 31–3, categorizes ethics in literature via the perspectives of different 
audiences: how individuals evaluate motives and actions in texts, how readers imagine 
or converse about their assessments, and how readers and critics link to discourse about 
morality by professional philosophers.
32 Nussbaum 1986, 1–15, while recognizing the reversals of fortune and irreconcilably 
conflicting imperatives by which Greek tragedy presents its moral dilemmas, is nevertheless 
a prime modern example of generalizing from tragedy to the everyday. 
 ethics of Aeschylus or the Oresteia as a whole), down to the perspective 
of one character (e.g., Agamemnon’s decision at Aulis), or a combination 
of these. In the case of Clytemnestra’s Ghost, the personal perspective 
predominates, both in her emphasis on herself and because she is outside 
the community of the living. Nevertheless, her references to her honor and 
social forces among the dead are crucial to understanding the dilemmas 
stemming from her undead state. The Oresteia, moreover, is a relentlessly 
interconnected text, thematically, linguistically, and philosophically, and 
therefore the Ghost’s rhetoric must be examined against other ghosts 
and ethical claims throughout the trilogy. Some must be traced beyond, 
to other Aeschylean plays and their evident precursors in Homer. 
Conjoined with the dramatic situation, analyses of ethics in Greek 
tragedy must carefully attend to the notion of “character,” since dramatic 
figures are constructs of the play’s language and limited stage action. Fac-
tors comprising a dramatic figure’s “character” include the Greek cultural 
notion of ethos (e.g., whether inherited or affected by a divinity) and the 
roles a figure plays in particular circumstances (such as “king” versus 
“father” in Agamemnon’s dilemma).29 Underlying these understandings 
of “character” as a person is the issue of the continuity of a staged figure 
from one scene to the next, what they know in each scene, and whether 
they are psychologically coherent or merely vehicles for the action.30 
What is the point of listening to the Ghost’s ethical claims? What 
does this, now dead, murderous character have to contribute to ethical 
thought? To begin to frame an answer one must inquire about whether 
Greek tragedy can serve as a template for normative ethics.31 Some 
thinkers attempt to draw general ethical insights from literature, includ-
ing tragedy.32 Formally speaking, such readings entail socially normative 
assumptions. Among these, albeit often unstated, are the requirements 
for agents to act within relatively stable social structures and to work to 
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33 Rachels 2009, 413–22, offers a brief introduction to 20th-century ethical theory. 
Narveson 2010 provides a recent representative example. The categories of normative theory 
focus either on determining what is best for society (consequentialism), the obligations of 
duty (deontology), or understanding how a virtuous actor would approach a dilemma (virtue 
ethics). This relationship of agent to society may also underlie some of the articulations of 
the ethics of Levinas (e.g., 1987), though he often frames ethics as an infinite obligation to 
the always separate, unknowable Other.
34 The recognition of the exceptional character of tragedy and the tragic hero goes 
back to Aristotle in the ancient world and Schelling at the beginning of modern philosophi-
cal approaches to tragedy. Useful surveys of philosophical theories of tragedy are Young 
2013 and Szondi 2002.
35 For example, Calchas in the Ag. interprets the omens at Aulis as the demand of 
Artemis, which the choral song indicates is the foundation for Agamemnon’s decision to 
sacrifice his daughter (Ag. 184–247). The vast debate concerning the ethics of Agamemnon’s 
decision includes Greene 1943; Lloyd-Jones 1962; Lesky 1966; Peradotto 1969; Edwards 
1977; Nussbaum 1986, 25–50; Griffith 1991; and Lawrence 2013, 71–83. In the Ch. Apollo’s 
oracle directly commands that Orestes avenge his father, even though it is reported in 
Orestes’ words and he shows some doubt (e.g., Ch. 269–305). For Orestes’ moral delibera-
tion see, among others, Zeitlin 1965, 496; Peradotto 1969, 258–61; Vellacott 1984a, 145–57; 
and Lawrence 2013, 89–100.
36 Foley 2001, 207–34, analyzes the living Clytemnestra’s dangerous questioning and 
subverting of the cultural assumptions of male dominance—sexual, political, linguistic, 
and violent.
37 Gill 1996, 94–174, analyzes the “problematic hero” (e.g., Achilles and Medea) as a 
critic of societal norms. The hero acts in a way that may seem to be extremely self-centered 
maintain them.33 Greek tragedies, however, often undercut the societal 
structures within them and thus challenge precisely such foundational 
premises.34 Tragic scenes of ethical deliberation consistently occur at 
moments of crisis for the agent and follow societally toxic transgres-
sions. Kin murder and subversions of the state are common throughout 
Greek tragedy. Moreover, in tragedy, as in epic, supernatural forces often 
pressure human agents in ways that affect ethical claims, whether with 
alterations of mental states, signs interpreted as divine demands, or direct 
commands.35 Contextually significant factors—such as the abnegation of 
family relations or a divine imperative to kill—warp the usual circum-
stances in which humans face ethical dilemmas. They thus bedevil any 
abstraction into ethical rules for conventional situations, and possibly 
even for dealing with grief and crisis. The particularities and extreme 
elements of tragic situations mean that discussions of ethics in tragedy 
rely on conscientious parsing of the dramatic context. In the case of 
the living Clytemnestra, the ethical questions, from the outset, concern 
situations beyond acceptable social confines.36 Her confrontations with 
society are the key to her living character’s tragic, ethical importance.37 
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(subjective) since s/he violates agreed upon ethical codes (sometimes horrifically, as with 
Medea’s murder of her children), but nevertheless exemplifies ethical notions of other sorts.
38 For modern philosophical approaches to death and the afterlife, see Moore 1981 
and Kagan 2012. See Shilo 2013 on ethical problems raised by different perspectives on the 
afterlife in Greek tragedy and how Plato reworks each one for philosophical questioning 
of values; cf. North 1992.
39 The Chorus of the Ag. recount citizen anger stemming from soldiers return-
ing as ashes from Troy (Ag. 429–74); the living Clytemnestra invokes Iphigeneia in the 
underworld and the Fury of the murdered to justify her killing of Agamemnon (e.g., Ag. 
1412–20 and 1525–9); Aegisthus recounts the tale of dead Thyestes and his brothers (Ag. 
1583–1603), who are visible to Cassandra as ghosts (Ag. 1095–7 and 1217–22); the mourners 
of Agamemnon present his dishonor in Hades and in the tomb as a reason for vengeance 
against Clytemnestra (Ch. 354–62); and Orestes promises action on behalf of Athens from 
beyond the grave (Eu. 762–77). 
It will become evident that the Ghost of Clytemnestra intensifies those 
challenges to normative constructs by breaking with so many aspects of 
life itself. 
Central to the discussion of the afterlife issues the Ghost raises, the 
continuity of a human after death strains the framework of most ethical 
analysis. Radically other concerns arise, such as what might affect the 
welfare of an individual’s continued existence as a disembodied soul, 
or how post-mortem divine punishment might redefine actions within a 
different ethical schema than that operating in life.38 Claims on behalf 
of the dead also implicate the uncertainty of relations between life and 
an afterlife that is inaccessible to the living. Just such appeals to justice 
for dead family members recur in scene after scene in the Oresteia, often 
with bloody consequences.39 Further issues, even paradoxes, emerge when 
the claims are made by the dead themselves. In Clytemnestra’s case, they 
present a non-standard ethical situation from a new perspective, that of 
a dead individual facing the consequences of living action. 
How are the bases for the Ghost’s claims affected by her status as a 
dream and as an afterlife figure? How does her rhetoric and description 
of her underworld state square with the speech of the living queen, a 
self-admitted dissembler (Ag. 1372–3)? The Ghost’s standing as an ethical 
figure is subverted so comprehensively that her character draws attention 
to the assumptions of normative ethics. Since the Ghost of Clytemnestra 
is no longer biologically alive, lacks contact with living human beings and 
a stake in human politics, yet has some continuity in the afterlife, her 
desire for retribution diverges from the claims of other characters in the 
trilogy, as well as from those of the Erinyes. A return to her rhetorical 
methods and the dynamics of her status as a dream will demonstrate how 
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40 For Greek beliefs concerning the afterlife, see Vermeule 1979; Vernant and Vidal-
Naquet 1972; Vernant 1989, 1991, and 2001; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995; Johnston 1999; Brem-
mer 1983 and 2002; and Edmonds 2015.
41 On death rituals, see Alexiou 2002, esp. 4–7; cf. Oakley 2004.
42 The haunting of survivors by the unburied and the apotropaic rituals against ghosts 
are analyzed in Johnston 1999, 9–10 and 38–81. On the need for burial and death ritual in 
the archaic and classical age, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1995.
43 Rohde 1925, 115–38; Burkert 1985, 203–8; Kearns 1989; Bremmer 2006, 15–20; and 
Parker 2011, 103–23. 
44 Sewell-Rutter 2007, 79–109; and Brown 1983.
each problematizes her claims. The combination of afterlife and socially 
problematic tragic elements is precisely the unique ethical challenge the 
Ghost of Clytemnestra presents.
IV. MATERIAL AND LITERARY BACKGROUND
Contemporary Greek cultural and literary treatments of afterlife figures 
help contextualize some of the Ghost of Clytemnestra’s exceptional fea-
tures. Greek concerns about the dead focused on memorialization and 
propitiatory rituals.40 In Athens, for which we have the best evidence, 
several civic festivals were explicitly concerned with yearly honoring of 
tombstones and prophylaxis against spirits who could become angry and 
affect life (Johnston 1999, 40–70). Rituals could be aristocratic or public, 
and these were often elaborate affairs in which processions and lament 
channeled grief and brought groups together, burial goods indicated 
honor, and markers at the grave focused memory.41 When the dead were 
thought to be agitated by a lack of care, such as remaining unburied, they 
were said to reappear, demanding, in a dream or through an intermediary, 
some ritual or action to return them to rest.42 
The mechanisms in Greek culture for the effects of the dead on 
life blurred the lines between human and divine. For example, heroes, 
who were conceived of as the powerful spirits of dead individuals, were 
local (unlike the gods) and had shrines throughout the landscape where 
they received ritual cult.43 In the Oresteia, Orestes speaks of himself after 
death in this way (Eu. 762–77). The Ghost of Clytemnestra, however, is 
not said to haunt Orestes directly, or to continue as a heroine, but rather 
must activate the Erinyes on her behalf. These chthonic deities from 
Mycenaean times have only minor cultic presence in Greek religion, but 
are widely invoked in Greek literature, especially Homeric epic and the 
Oresteia, as demons who enforce cosmic balance through vengeance.44 
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45 Graf and Johnston 2007; Edmonds 2004 and 2011; and Bernabé, Cristóbal and 
Isabel 2008.
46 Homer only describes penalties for great sinners and rewards for those connected 
with the gods. The Hymn to Demeter presents the first reward or punishment for ordinary 
people’s actions in life, which is connected to ritual (the Eleusinian Mysteries), not moral-
ity. Pindar’s brief and vague mention of afterlife punishments and rewards (Ol. 2.56–82) is 
more along the lines of moral or ethical thinking. Cf. Johnston 1999, 11–12, 31–2 and 98–9; 
Burkert 1985, 190–208 and 276–301; Albinus 2000; and Edmonds 2015.
47 Discussion of other versions of the afterlife and of later ghost scenes in tragedy 
are beyond the scope of this argument, but are fruitful areas for further research. These 
include the Hesiodic spirits of the dead from different Ages of Man (WD 121–6, 140–3, and 
167–74) and Herodotus’ story of Melissa at the Oracle of the Dead (5.92). Other undead 
figures in extant tragedies after Aeschylus include Polydorus’ Ghost in Euripides’ Hec. and 
Achilles’ Ghost mentioned within his speech.
48 See Tsagarakis 2000, esp. 105–23, for the discrepancies in Od. 11 between the 
nearly immaterial, witless soul—correlating to the destruction of the body in cremation 
rituals—and a more physical concept of the dead interacting with each other and their 
surroundings in Hades—correlating with inhumation. 
49 Patroclus begins his exhortation to Achilles with the indicative εὕδεις, “you are 
asleep!” (Il. 23.69). Clytemnestra’s beginning, εὕδοιτ᾽ ἄν, “you would be asleep!” (Eu. 94) 
may be read as a sarcastic optative (Smyth §1826). A systematic comparison between these 
two ghosts has, as far as I know, yet to be made.
The Ghost of Clytemnestra scene, by featuring both her animate spirit 
and the Erinyes, combines the generally familial and civic concern with 
ritual burial and a more universal ethical notion of justice for the dead. 
In terms of cultural ideas of the afterlife, it is significant that Hades 
received little worship, although shrines to him existed (Burkert 1985, 
195–201). Certain mystery religions—such as the Orphic, Dionysian, and 
Eleusinian (which had a festival connected with Athens)—offered an 
improved fate in the afterlife.45 In Aeschylus’ time, however, there was 
no shared, clear picture of the afterlife in cult, nor widespread belief in 
ethical judgment after death.46 
The Homeric afterlife is the most relevant literary precursor for the 
Oresteia.47 Homer’s afterlife descriptions contain elements of two notions: 
the idea that the physical body continues in limited ways below competes 
with a version of an immaterial soul in Odyssey 11.48 Homeric afterlife 
figures also contrast with the concerns, physical status, and rhetoric of 
Clytemnestra’s Ghost. The Ghost of Patroclus (Il. 23.62–107) is Clytem-
nestra’s most obvious precursor in surviving literature: both appear in the 
dream of their addressee (Achilles and the Erinyes respectively), begin 
their rebukes of the sleepers with the same verb (εὕδω), and describe 
their suffering in the afterlife to motivate the addressee’s actions in the 
living world.49 Patroclus is called a psyche\ (“soul”), yet he does not refer 
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50 The Iliad poet names the visitation in Achilles’ sleep the “psyche\ of Patroclus” 
(ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος, 23.65), as does Achilles once he has awakened (Πατροκλῆος  .  .  . ψυχή, 
23.105–6). On the other hand, within the dream Achilles addresses the figure as his actual 
companion (23.94–8), not a psyche\, nor a dream. The Patroclus figure himself does not use 
any of the terms psyche\, eido\lon, or onar for himself, only for others (ψυχαί, εἴδωλα, 23.72). 
51 Vengeance is entirely suppressed in all instances of the Homeric afterlife, not only 
in the Patroclus scene. The shade of Agamemnon, for example, narrates to Odysseus Cly-
temnestra’s treachery and his attempt to kill her when he was dying but mentions nothing 
about vengeance now that he is dead (Od. 11.405–56), only asking about the whereabouts 
of his son (457–61). Yet, at the very start of the Od., Zeus had already spoken of the 
requital brought by Orestes on Aegisthus (Od. 1.40–3); see D’Arms and Hulley 1946 and 
Marks 2008, 17–35. 
52 That is, the Iliad’s scene mainly spurs the fulfillment of a human ritual obligation, 
only what the culture already considers an imperative. Richardson 1990, 172–3, n. 23, 69–92, 
puts this in the context of Homeric double motivation. 
53 He is also a psyche\ (ψυχὴ Ἐλπήνορος, Od. 11.51) and his ambush of Odysseus before 
the other dead represents his not having entered the house of Hades proper (Tsagarakis 2000, 
33). Beyond the call for Odysseus to remember him long enough to bury him (Od. 11.71–2, 
and cf. Il. 23.69), he desires to be objectified in a memorial for those in the future (11.75–6).
to himself as either a psyche\ or a dream.50 When, in a poignant moment, 
Patroclus asks Achilles to give him his hand (μοι δὸς τὴν χεῖρ’, 23.75), 
Achilles’ inability to embrace the image instantly exposes the discontinuity 
between the living Patroclus and his impalpable, shrieking, fleeing psyche\ 
(23.99–101). This ending to the Ghost scene emphasizes the disparity 
between the psyche\ and the living person in terms of how both characters 
conceptualize its corporeality. The psyche\ acts and speaks as if he is still 
physically cohesive. Achilles, at first, takes the psyche\ for his embraceable 
companion, yet the action dramatically reveals the psyche\’s immaterial 
nature (Vernant 1991, 189). This undead dream scene thus draws atten-
tion to the problematics of self-reference and incorporeality after death. 
In Homer, when ghosts demand action on their behalf they are con-
cerned with ritual burial, not vengeance.51 Even though Achilles becomes 
obsessed with avenging his friend’s death, the Ghost of Patroclus does 
not even mention his killers, but focuses his companion on the immediate 
fulfilment of the burial that will enable him to proceed through the Gates 
of Hades (23.71).52 This is the case as well with the Ghost of Elpenor (Od. 
11.71–6), who is simultaneously concerned to set up a reminder of his 
existence for the living.53 The Ghost of Elpenor explicitly states that his 
shade would become a supernatural affliction on Odysseus in the living 
world were he to be left unburied (11.73). Despite such threats, however, 
not one of the Homeric dead ever manifests power over the living, nor 
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54 Hence all the dishonoring of enemy corpses and seeming unconcern for the crema-
tion of common soldiers (Garland 1984). 
55 On a theatrical level, her very reappearance fits the general pattern in the Or. of 
the increasing embodiment of superhuman elements: early in the trilogy, characters invoke 
supernatural forces as abstractions; then, characters declare that they perceive these forces 
manifesting their efficacy through visions and signs; last, the forces themselves appear 
hypostatized onstage and speak; see Lattimore 1953, 13–15; Kitto 1961, 23; Lebeck 1971, 
1–3; and Sommerstein 2010, 171–81. On this arc in references to the Erinyes, Apollo, and 
Athena see Brown 1983, 29–30; and Bacon 2001, esp. 48 and 52.
56 E.g., Patroclus’ imperative (Il. 23.71): θάπτε με ὅττι τάχιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω. 
“Bury me as quickly as possible so that I may pass through the gates of Hades!” In this 
command the Ghost of Patroclus refers to his corpse as himself (“bury me,” θάπτε με) and 
to his underworld existence (“so that I may pass through,” περήσω) equally as himself. 
do the living show much fear of their threatened vengeance.54 With this 
background it is now possible to return, in greater detail, to the Ghost 
of Clytemnestra’s rhetoric, her claims, and their complications.
V. THE DREAM OF CLYTEMNESTRA:  
PRESENCE, SELF-REFERENCE, AND IMAGE
Like the Ghosts of Patroclus and Elpenor, the Ghost of Clytemnestra 
articulates her demands rhetorically to the agents who she hopes will 
fulfill them. By contrast, however, she supports her claims by emphasiz-
ing her presence, most obviously by linguistically drawing attention to 
her visible self (“this mother,” τῆσδε μητρός, Eu. 122) and her wounds 
(“these wounds,” πληγὰς τάσδε, 103). The intervention of the Ghost of 
Clytemnestra in the Eumenides as a speaking, present, undead figure 
allows her to break the silence of her corpse onstage in the Choephoroi.55 
Yet her speeches proceed to diverge widely from those of the Ghosts 
of Patroclus and Elpenor, drawing attention to the anomalies of ghostly 
speech concerning the visible first person, the represented spectral body, 
and continuity after death. 
The first set of such differences concerns self-reference. The Ghost 
of Clytemnestra uses first-person singulars for her underworld self (e.g., 
ἐγώ, ἀπητιμασμένη, 95; ἀλῶμαι, 98; ἔχω, 99), her previous living self (“I 
killed,” ἔκτανον, 96), and her current stage-figure (“I declare,” προυννέπω, 
98). In this she resembles the Ghosts of Patroclus and Elpenor, who con-
flate their references to themselves as speaker, dead body, and afterlife 
psyche\.56 Neither Homeric ghost, however, mentions his name or current 
status (whether as a dream or a psyche\). The figure in the Eumenides 
both refers to herself as Clytemnestra and draws attention to the fact 
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Through this elision, and by never referring to himself as soul, image, or dream, he treats 
his formerly living state, his corpse, his underworld self, and his speaking appearance in 
Achilles’ dream as a unified, continuous self. 
57 The problem of supernatural invisibility to human beings occurs several times in 
the trilogy: Cassandra’s vision of Thyestes’ children is invisible to the Chorus in the Ag. 
and Orestes sees the Erinyes that the Chorus do not in the final scene of the Ch.; cf. Brown 
1983. It is a matter of directorial choice whether the audience glimpses these silent figures; 
the text provides no clues as to their staging.
58 Goldhill 1984, passim, draws out the intricately intermeshed concerns with epis-
temology, vision, and language in the Or.
that she appears in a dream (ὄναρ γὰρ ὑμᾶς νῦν Κλυταιμήστρα καλῶ, Eu. 
116). Clytemnestra’s multi-layered self-reference in this line invokes the 
Erinyes in the first person (ὑμᾶς . . . καλῶ) and simultaneously appends 
self-invocation (Κλυταιμήστρα). Her conjuring of her own presence is 
only made more eerily potent through her simultaneous understanding 
of her absence, of herself as a dream. 
The Ghost of Clytemnestra convolutes the issue of her presence 
further when she refers to interrupting the second dream the Erinyes are 
experiencing: “You are pursuing a beast in a dream” (ὄναρ διώκεις θῆρα, 
Eu. 131). The Ghost, visible to the audience, is commenting on a dream 
that is invisible to the audience. Her metaphorical use of words for vision 
within the dream (especially ὅρα . .  . καρδίᾳ, 103; but also ὁρῶ, 110; and 
ἐγκατιλλώψας, 113) only further problematize her effective invisibility.57 
For she is not only both present and absent, as is any ghost, but she is 
also unseen by any internal audience. Unlike the psyche\ of Patroclus or 
the Children of Thyestes, she never appears to any human beings—not 
to Orestes nor to the Pythia, who both see the Erinyes—nor even to the 
Erinyes themselves, who only see Orestes in their sleep, and never address 
Clytemnestra when they awaken, implying she is already gone. Her mise 
en abyme displacement of presence and visibility puts Clytemnestra at 
multiple removes from the living, human world. 
The Ghost’s liminal status as an incorporeal double of a dead, 
dissembling murderer distills the Oresteia’s recurrent problematizing of 
image as false presence. The trilogy often connects such suspicion with the 
issue of language as false image.58 The Agamemnon, especially, is glutted 
with critiques of the veracity of both: the Chorus and Clytemnestra in 
dialogue equate the “phantoms of dreams” (ὀνείρων φάσματ’, Ag. 274) with 
divine deception (δολώσαντος θεοῦ, 273), with “the (vain) belief . . . of a 
slumbering mind” (δόξαν . . . βριζούσης φρενός, 275), and with “un-winged 
rumor” (ἄπτερος φάτις, 276). They also connect “dream-appearances” 
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59 Foley 2001, 207, shows that rumors and dreams are spoken of as “women’s think-
ing” in the trilogy; cf. McClure 1999, 74–9. On the living Clytemnestra’s problematic speech 
see Goldhill 1984, esp. 68, 74–5, and 77, and on these themes in her Ghost scene, 213–15. 
60 On the logic of blood for blood in the Or. and its connections to other liquids such 
as dew, milk, libations, and the Erinyes’ venom, see Lebeck 1971, 80–91; and Sommerstein 
2010, 171–8.
61 For the relationship of ghosts in the trilogy to sleep and dreams, see Mace 2002 
and 2004. 
(ὀνειρόφαντοι, 420) with “(vain) beliefs” (δόξαι, 421) and oppose dreams 
to the truth (εἴτ’ οὖν ἀληθεῖς εἴτ’ ὀνειράτων δίκην, 491). Agamemnon, as 
well, describes deception within the “mirror” of social relations as “an 
image of a shadow” (κάτοπτρον, εἴδωλον σκιᾶς, 839). Human characters 
in the Agamemnon thus enmesh the language of image with epistemo-
logical problems. This is especially evident in the Chorus’s anxiety over 
the living Clytemnestra’s verbal fabrication.59 The taint of dreams and 
images thus already infects her language, and is redoubled when she 
herself returns as a dream. 
The problematics of image concern the Ghost’s ethical argument 
in part due to her continuity of form. For the Ghost’s image relates less 
to Clytemnestra’s living body than to her corpse. The Ghost supports her 
claims by pointing to her wounds as irrefutable evidence for her petition 
through a verb of seeing and a deictic: “See these wounds in your heart!” 
(ὅρα δὲ πληγὰς τάσδε καρδίᾳ σέθεν, Eu. 103). She thus draws on the oft-
repeated ethical claim in the Oresteia (before the new law of Athena) 
that bloodshed necessarily entails further bloodshed. This emphasizes the 
physicality of the wounds and the liquid drawn from them, a recurrent, 
fluctuating theme in the trilogy.60 Yet unlike wounds on a living being, 
those on the Ghost of Clytemnestra operate as signs without substance, 
just as subject to her manipulation as language and image. 
A ghost scene in the Agamemnon allows a clarifying comparison 
along the lines of image, wounds, and dreams. Cassandra points out the 
dead children of Thyestes (invisible to the Chorus and, presumably, the 
audience) with the same verb in the imperative and deictic as the Ghost 
of Clytemnestra uses for her wounds: “see these children!” (ὁρᾶτε τούσδε 
τοὺς . . . νέους, Ag. 1217–8). Cassandra describes them holding their flesh 
and innards in their hands (1220–1). These she interprets to be the signs 
of their murders that demand requital against Agamemnon (1223–38). 
Yet Cassandra’s language stresses that these are only the visions of the 
children, not their reanimated corpses: she sees them “bearing the forms 
of dreams” (ὀνείρων προσφερεῖς μορφώμασιν, 1218), although she is not 
asleep.61 Cassandra’s emphasis on the dead children as images without 
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62 On this display of justice, see Rousseau 1963, esp. 126–7; and Goldhill 1984, 101 
and 198–9. 
63 Again, the staging is unknown, but see Sommerstein 1989, 33, 100–1, and n. 94–139.
64 See, e.g., Vellacott 1984a on the tie between Apollo and Orestes. 
65 On deictics as bridging reality and fantasy, see Felson 2004, 253. 
66 Holmes 2010, esp. 41–83 and 228–74, brings new attention to the issue of the bio-
logical body and the possibilities of non-physical action (divine or demonic) that affects it 
in Greek thought; cf. Williams 1993, 21–30.
substance and her interpretation of their wounds for vengeance thus 
provide a template for the Eumenides scene. 
The Ghost of Clytemnestra, by contrast, is both the interpreter of 
her own wounds and staged to be visible to the audience. These seem-
ingly minor differences are immensely significant. The wounds from 
Clytemnestra’s violent murder leave stains that her Ghost now uses 
to exceed their intended purpose, the vengeance with which audiences 
might have sympathized. Near the end of the Choephoroi Orestes dis-
plays his mother’s corpse to humans, the gods, and the theater audience 
with verbs of seeing (e.g., ἴδεσθε, Ch. 973; ἴδεσθε δ’ αὖτε, 980; and δείξαθ’, 
984), and describes the killing of his mother as justice (ἐνδίκως φόνον 
τὸν μητρός, Ch. 988–9; and κτανεῖν τέ φημι μητέρ’ οὐκ ἄνευ δίκης, 1027).62 
Perhaps the corpse was then clothed in a bloody costume now worn by 
Clytemnestra’s Ghost.63 In transporting these brutal marks back from 
the afterlife, though, the Ghost strips them of the signification Orestes 
assigned: in her telling, the gory writing on her body recounts none of 
Orestes’ dilemma and plotting, nor any divine justification from Apollo’s 
oracles.64 Instead, the Ghost treats the wounds as a palimpsest on which 
she writes her own meaning over Orestes’. The reversal is consummate: 
whereas the murderer points to the wounds on the corpse, claiming that 
they are marks of justly completed vengeance, the dream of the murdered 
now points to the very same marks on herself and counterclaims that it 
is just to seek vengeance for these wounds. 
The complicating factor in this struggle over meaning is that the 
marks themselves are not actual wounds. In fact, it is precisely the deictics 
in the phrases “these wounds” (πληγὰς τάσδε, Eu. 103) that conjoin several 
levels of representational fiction.65 Although presumably visible to the 
audience, the wounds cannot be biological injuries for two reasons: first, 
as is evident from her placement in a dream, the Ghost of Clytemnestra 
lacks material substance in the dramatic world.66 That is, the marks visible 
on her image alert an audience to the lack of biological wounds even 
within the play; any representation of wounds, even a spray of ruby 
blood out of a gaping neck, would still fail to designate a human body’s 
556 AMIT SHILO
67 They are also not dramatically necessary: “Wounds function as the marks, the evi-
dence or inscriptions, of violence, regardless of whether these wounds are textual, reported, 
or enacted” (Cawthorn 2008, 22). 
68 “And many men killed in war, having been wounded with bronze spears, wearing 
their blood-stained armor” (Od. 11.40–1). 
69 Note that Agamemnon in the underworld cannot be imagined to be covered in 
stab wounds from his murder, for Odysseus asks him whether he was killed in battle or 
drowned (Od. 11.397–403). 
70 Note, too, that grave goods did not picture the animate dead as injured, but as 
they were in life or as winged souls (Vermeule 1979, 1–23). 
71 On deictics in tragedy pointing out stage material, like props (or in this case, a cos-
tume), see Mueller 2016, 7, and on Clytemnestra’s net-trap-robe theme, 42–69. On Aeschylus’ 
use of terrifying costumes for the Erinyes from later evidence, see the Vita Aeschyli 9 (= 
TGF 3 T A1.30–32 Radt) with discussion in Calder 1988; and Frontisi-Ducroux 2007, 165–74. 
wounds, since they are worn by an apparition. This ghostly figure is not 
meant to be identical with the corpse, but is a dream of the incorporeal 
dead queen. Her visible wounds are thus superfluous.67 Since the wounds 
to which the Ghost of Clytemnestra points with her demonstrative lack 
substance, the ethical appeal from them is deeply compromised.
One might well suspect this first point: are not the wounds visible 
on Clytemnestra’s Ghost merely a natural extension of the wounds her 
body suffered at the moment of death? Support for this critique comes 
not only from the appearance of the Children of Thyestes, but from the 
precedent of Odyssey 11, in which Odysseus tells of encountering wounded 
and bloody soldiers among the dead.68 The Iliad’s Ghost of Patroclus, 
however, provides a powerful counterexample. It illustrates that there 
is no requisite connection between wounds on a corpse and wounds on 
the dream of the dead. The Iliad explicitly states that Patroclus’ psyche\ 
appears like the living Patroclus in body and clothing (Il. 23.66–7). In 
other words, he appears as he was in any other moment of life—any 
moment but his naked, spear-pierced, battlefield death. Even in Odys-
seus’ underworld, the images of the dead often do not bear the marks of 
their death.69 Since the Ghost of Clytemnestra forges an imperative for 
vengeance in part from the reference to her visible wounds, it becomes 
important to emphasize that their appearance on her image is by no 
means literarily or culturally necessary.70 
The second point concerning the Ghost’s wounds is that her appear-
ance in a double set of dreams, and onstage, complicates her argument 
from the physical even further. Clytemnestra’s mention of wounds directs 
the attention of the sleeping Erinyes and the audience to a costume.71 
The imperative “see” (ὅρα) initiates a type of vision detached from the 
normal human experience. This operates at a double remove from literal 
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72 Ostensibly it is each Erinys who must see the wounds with her mind’s eye in Eu. 
103 (Sommerstein 1989, ad loc.). However, as in every utterance onstage, the Ghost is 
simultaneously addressing the audience.
73 It is significant in this context that the Erinyes themselves were previously invis-
ible abstractions who are now staged characters. They draw the audience’s attention to the 
nature of the dramatized image; see Bacon 2001, 57; and Zeitlin 1965, 488–98.
74 Johnston 1999, 24–5, relates the problem of image in Greek social and religious 
attitudes about ghosts to the nature of tragedy as a genre: “The ghost—the eido\lon, the skia, 
the phasma, that thing that is here in front of our eyes and yet not really here—emblematizes 
quite nicely the slippage between reality and illusion that tragedy loved.” 
75 This example of Aeschylean metatheater is subtle, but operates like the more 
explicit examples in later playwrights that have drawn far more attention from scholars. 
It corresponds to the focus of the second wave of metatheatrical studies of Greek tragedy 
sketched out in Dunn 2010, 5–6, the subtle use of stage properties as empty signs that can 
be filled with meaning, but also draw attention to the dramatic illusion; cf. Zeitlin 1990, 
63–96, and 2010, esp. 266–7; and Mueller 2016, 1–8. 
76 On the use of metafictional or metatheatrical self-awareness as a device to connect 
with the theatrical audience, see Ringer 1998, 7–19; Dobrov 2001, 4–18; and Dunn 2010, 5–17. 
sight for the internal audience, the Erinyes: they either see Clytemnestra’s 
Ghost in a dream, or do not see her at all, since they appear to be pay-
ing attention exclusively to their chase of Orestes, himself in an invisible 
dream. Moreover, the command “see!” works differently for the theatrical 
audience, who presumably see a costumed representation of a dream.72 
This is therefore more than a simple reference to stage machinery: the 
audience must treat either a portrayal of wounds on her costume, or 
even nothing at all, as the invisible dream of wounds on the image of an 
animate corpse.73 The effect is that of a hall of mirrors and transparencies, 
which draws attention to the very nature of this character’s visibility.74 
The compromised wounds indicate a sophisticated piece of metatheater: 
the Ghost’s reference to her costume implicates spectatorship and locates 
the production of dramatic meaning in non-literal seeing.75 Additionally, 
even the audience must see them in the “mind’s eye” or, as the Ghost 
puts it, “heart.” That is, regardless of their visual presence on a costume, 
for their ethical effect they must be felt.
The Ghost of Clytemnestra’s staging and language advertise that 
the character before the audience is only the façade of a human being, a 
mere dream of demons. The layers of precarious visibility and ambiguous 
presence comprise the multiple removes between the ethical appeals of 
the Ghost and those of living characters. These fissures in her language of 
self-reference thus undermine one basis of her imperative for vengeance. 
Crucially, the Ghost herself seems almost aware of it.76 Her very vocabulary 
of dreams and visibility simultaneously destabilizes presence, center, and 
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77 Garner 1990, 36, catches the ironic reversal in this fantasy embrace and draws 
attention to the Homeric allusion in the phrase Clytemnestra uses (περὶ χεῖρα βαλοῦσα, Ag. 
1559): this is almost precisely how Odysseus describes his fruitless attempt to embrace his 
mother’s shade (περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε, Od. 11.211; cf. Od. 11.392–4 and Il. 23.75 and 99–101). 
78 See Neuburg 1991 and Foley 2001, 211–34, on the living Clytemnestra’s stated 
motivations: human, from her own reasons, on the one hand, and divine, as part of the 
curse of the house, on the other. On the double-determination principle at work in Greek 
tragedy in general and in the Or. in particular, see Sommerstein 2010, 262–7.
reality, a set of obfuscations that extends the rhetorical mastery of the 
living Clytemnestra. This is part of the Ghost’s double move to support 
her ethical claims through linguistic manipulation: she makes dubious 
assertions but blurs their structure to avoid refutation. 
VI. THE “MOTHER OF HADES”: INVENTING  
AND WARPING THE AFTERLIFE
The Ghost’s uncorroborated story of her own afterlife (Eu. 95–8) ought 
to arouse just as much suspicion as her phantom wounds. Her narra-
tion is reminiscent of the rhetorical techniques the living queen used to 
manipulate Agamemnon. After the act Clytemnestra straightforwardly 
admitted to having used deceptive language (Ag. 1372–3), yet duplic-
ity was not her only tool. For the sake of vindicating her action to the 
Chorus of the Agamemnon she also invented an underworld tale. In her 
response to the Elders’ question concerning who will grieve for the dead 
king, Clytemnestra described an ironic scene: Iphigenia—the daughter 
Agamemnon bound, gagged, and slaughtered—embraces and kisses him in 
the house of Hades (1555–9, cf. 1525–9).77 The living Clytemnestra’s verbal 
creation of a post-mortem scene clarifies the Ghost’s later depiction of 
the underworld in two ways: first, she justified Agamemnon’s slaying by 
appealing to their daughter’s continuity after death. That is, Iphigenia’s 
non-disappearance implies an ethical basis for requital on her behalf. 
Second, imagining Agamemnon’s facing the daughter he killed in the 
afterlife strengthened Clytemnestra’s argument that her act is only a seg-
ment of a greater cycle of punishment that includes superhuman elements, 
such as the curse of the house and underworld suffering.78 The image she 
created of Iphigenia (whom she names in Ag. 1527 and 1555) waiting to 
embrace her murderous father ties into the assertion by the Ghost that 
those she killed (presumably Agamemnon and Cassandra, although she 
suppresses their names) relentlessly hound her in the afterlife (Eu. 95–8). 
Now it is Clytemnestra’s Ghost who fears an embrace by the victims of 
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79 The phrase may be taken in many ways, including references to her own murders 
against her kin, to Iphigeneia, and to her ties to destructive forces more generally, cf. Den-
niston and Page 1957, ad loc.; Zeitlin 1966, 646–52; and Rabinowitz 1981, 156–67.
80 This description specifically includes the crime of a child against a parent (Eu. 
270–1), which fits the Erinyes’ addressee, Orestes, if not Clytemnestra.
81 This emphasis on suffering loops back to the living queen’s speech to Agamemnon, 
where her tendentious story of torment in his absence was one of her rhetorical ploys (Ag. 
855–913); cf. Foley 2001, 209. Once invoked, however, the Erinyes are implacable until 
murder, effectively reversing the imagined familial reunion scene between 
Agamemnon and Iphigenia. The character of Clytemnestra (living and 
dead) conjoins human relations in the afterlife to murderous action in 
both these depictions: in the Agamemnon as part of justifying her killing 
after the fact, in the Eumenides to activate the Erinyes for vengeance. 
Linking the ideas of involvement with the afterlife and rhetorical 
invention is Cassandra’s moniker for Clytemnestra, a “mother of Hades” 
(Ἅιδου μητέρ ,᾽ Ag. 1235).79 Clytemnestra’s Ghost is strongly conjoined to 
Hades, presumably appearing from that realm (cf. the Ghost of Darius 
in Pers. 607–842). But since she is the only source for her own afterlife, 
it is crucial to note that her depiction of it in the Eumenides only cor-
relates with her own in the Agamemnon, not with any other mentions of 
the afterlife in the trilogy. Conspicuously absent is any acknowledgment 
of a divine system of moral punishment: Clytemnestra’s Ghost does not 
describe hounding in life by divine spirits of vengeance and subsequent 
retribution in the afterlife, which is the worldview articulated by the 
Elders of the Agamemnon (Ag. 461–8). Nor does her tale corroborate 
the Erinyes’ description of the afterlife in the Eumenides, in which the 
chthonic goddesses themselves drag mortals down to punishment by 
Hades (Eu. 267–75). This Great Assessor of humankind (μέγας . . . εὔθυνος 
βροτῶν, 273) is said to punish every mortal who transgresses (τις . . . ἤλιτεν 
βροτῶν, 269).80 Hades, though, does not figure into Clytemnestra’s afterlife. 
The Erinyes even claim to Orestes that Clytemnestra is “free by virtue 
of being murdered” (ἡ δ’ ἐλευθέρα φόνῳ, Eu. 603), effectively eliminating 
from consideration the issue of her continuing punishment. Thus the play 
gives ethical room for Clytemnestra to make her arguments. Even as the 
Ghost seeks help from universal forces of requital, her representation of 
her afterlife evades the possibility that she is subject to continuing divine 
punishment for her murders. 
Instead of ethical punishment by divinities, the Ghost of Clytem-
nestra recounts a far more personal ordeal in the underworld. Part of 
her rhetoric even attempts to move the Erinyes to pity her suffering (κοὐ 
κατοικτίζεις πάθος, 121; cf. παθοῦσα, 100).81 She portrays herself as the 
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the death of their victim (e.g., Eu. 415–23), and the Ghost herself emphasizes their evil, 
destructive nature (e.g., Eu. 125).
82 Compare the three uses of ὄνειδος in this section of less than 60 lines with only 
two in the rest of the Or. (Ag. 1560 and Ch. 495).
83 See Williams 1993, 75–102, for a discussion of Greek notions of heroic honor and 
shame (in Greek tragedy especially) as an internalized force—instead of simply social 
pressure—but one that can always potentially come from an agent outside of the self. On 
the notion of responsibility in the vocabulary of αἰτία in Greek thought more generally, see 
50–8; cf. Cairns 1993, esp. 178–214, on Aeschylus. 
84 Cairns 1993, 204–6; and Foley 2001, 201–34. Goldhill 1984, 89–91, links the rheto-
ric of Clytemnestra’s appropriated κράτος, “power/political power,” and lack of αἰσχύνη, 
“shame,” with that of her transgressive language and sexuality.
85 Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012, 304 and 336–7, among others, treats this shame and 
dishonor as Clytemnestra’s punishment and the mark of her final defeat, without reference 
to how the Ghost manipulates these very terms to continue her claims through the Erinyes. 
 victim, not only of Orestes, but of other dead below. In this, as in a number 
of other ways, she is akin to the Ghost of Patroclus. In his narrative the 
dead are an umbrageous multitude that crowd him away from the house 
of Hades: “but I wander purposelessly” (ἀλλ’ αὔτως ἀλάλημαι, Il. 23.74). 
When the Ghost of Clytemnestra laments “and I wander shamefully” 
(αἰσχρῶς δ᾽ ἀλῶμαι, Eu. 98) she employs the same verb (ἀλάομαι) and 
even echoes the alliteration—an intriguing reminiscence of the Homeric 
scene. Significantly, she replaces the notion of simple exclusion with active 
shame. Her rhetoric, therefore, involves the concern with one particular 
aspect of society, extended to the world below: her Ghost links αἰσχρῶς 
(“shamefully,” 98) and αἰτία (“responsibility, guilt, blame,” 99) with ὄνειδος 
(“shame, reproach,” 97), which is used more often in this scene than in 
the rest of the trilogy combined.82 Together, these words strongly imply 
a community with social norms.83 
Both in life and in the afterlife, however, Clytemnestra defies com-
munal mores, twisting the normal sense of shame and responsibility.84 The 
terms αἰσχρῶς, αἰτία, and ὄνειδος might seem to indicate that Clytemnestra 
is facing humiliating punishment below.85 Yet the Ghost actively revises 
the meaning of ὄνειδος in her next lines. She minimizes its connection 
with “shame,” redirecting its force towards its other meaning, “reproach.” 
With this reproach she incites the Erinyes to kill on her behalf: “feel pain 
in your liver from just reproaches” (ἄλγησον ἧπαρ ἐνδίκοις ὀνείδεσιν, Eu. 
135). This is the Ghost’s only mention of any form of the term dike\, “jus-
tice.” She uses it solely to intensify her admonitions against the Erinyes, 
561THE GHOST OF CLYTEMNESTRA IN THE EUMENIDES
86 The living Clytemnestra, by contrast, consistently emphasized the rightness of her 
acts, even claiming the goddess Justice was on her side after killing Agamemnon (e.g., Ag. 
1432); cf. Foley 2001, 201–34. 
87 Her protest echoes the “dishonor” (ἀτίμους Ch. 443, cf. 94, 408, and 485) that 
the Chorus of the Ch. attributes to Agamemnon and his children; see Sommerstein 1989, 
101–2, n. 95. 
88 ἐγὼ δ’ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν ὧδ’ ἀπητιμασμένη, “I, dishonored thus by you” (Eu. 95), or “thanks 
to you,” as, e.g., Sommerstein 1989 and 2008b translates. 
89 E.g., Eu. 394, 780, 792, 796, 807, 824, 838, 845, and 853–4. 
90 The Ghost’s treatment of the afterlife as an “elsewhere” is analogous to what 
Zeitlin 1986 identifies in the classic analysis of the theatrical setting of Thebes (and Argos) 
as a “site of displacement” for Athens; cf. Kurke 2013. 
rather than claiming that the act of vengeance she calls for is just.86 As 
part of her avoidance of ethical responsibility the Ghost redirects the 
negative pressure of her vocabulary to create an imperative for murder. 
Instead of justice or societal good, the Ghost’s rhetoric focuses value 
purely on herself. Her appeal to the Erinyes is partly grounded on the 
argument that the lack of vengeance causes her dishonor (ἀπητιμασμένη, 
95).87 The Ghost attempts to protect her “honor” in a manner that neglects 
the other crucial aspects of τιμή, both “office” and “duty.” She intends no 
reciprocal contribution to society, as is necessary when honor operates 
in the living world. Clytemnestra’s Ghost rather links her honor and 
dishonor to the Erinyes.88 She reminds the dark deities of her nighttime 
offerings (106–9) for which they now owe her this pursuit. Ironically, she 
herself invokes duty by urging the Erinyes to perform their assigned 
functions (πέπρωται πρᾶγμα, 125), which they continually connect with 
their own “honor” and “dishonor.”89 In disconnecting honor from duty, 
the Ghost thus differentiates herself from the Erinyes, who several 
times articulate their function as valuable in the largest schema of the 
social order, and whose acceptance of honors in Athens leads them to 
abandon her cause. 
These problematic elements together compromise the afterlife that 
Clytemnestra’s Ghost narrates as a foundation for her ethical claims. With 
her appeal to another realm, the Ghost provides herself an “elsewhere” 
that is free from the socio-political mores of Argos (and Athens).90 She 
can thus ignore the reciprocal relations involved in words like “shame” 
and “honor,” and convolute the meanings of these terms for her own 
ends. She depicts her suffering below, but instead of the conclusion 
others might draw from it—that this is divine or human punishment 
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for her crimes—she twists it into motivation for further familial blood-
shed. Evident in the Ghost’s afterlife story are the connections to the 
living Clytemnestra’s duplicity. These, alongside her arguments from 
individual dishonor and her tendentious interpretation of “reproach,” 
all undercut her ethical appeals. Moreover, the Eumenides itself takes 
the transformation of reproach even further, since the Erinyes only refer 
to Clytemnestra as the “reproach from dreams” (ὄνειδος ἐξ ὀνειράτων, 
155; cf. Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012, 308 n. 1126). “Reproach” thus comes 
to replace Clytemnestra’s name, which is never spoken by any character 
again. The Ghost makes specific linguistic moves to transform social 
pressure into vengeance, using the same vocabulary with which the other 
characters write her out of the play. 
VII. SPEAKING FOR HER VERY SOUL
The Ghost of Clytemnestra loses. Once the Eumenides moves to Athens, 
Athena uses civic, collective language to overturn the kingship and kin-
ship structures of Argos. The ending of the trilogy deliberately shifts its 
focus away from individual characters and thus from “the living and the 
dead” Clytemnestra’s personal arguments. It would be irresponsible to 
the ethical claims of tragic characters, however, to simply accept their 
dramatic fate. Tragic characters routinely suffer ignominious endings, 
sometimes without redeeming reversals. For an ethically responsible 
reading one must integrate the perspective of the character involved. 
It is thus imperative to heed how the Ghost of Clytemnestra marks the 
stakes of her ethical appeals. She does so in an extraordinarily condensed 
manner, with a striking use of the term psyche\ (Eu. 114–5): 
ἀκούσαθ᾽ ὡς ἔλεξα τῆς ἐμῆς περὶ 
ψυχῆς· 
Hear me, as I have spoken for my very soul!
The phrase “for my very psyche\” summarizes the Ghost’s pleading. Yet 
the term psyche\ here involves a problem of self-reference, besides those 
of dream and insubstantiality discussed earlier. Whereas in Homeric 
afterlife scenes psyche\ denoted the ghosts and dead themselves, the Ghost 
of Clytemnestra never refers to herself as a psyche\. Instead, her language 
here objectifies her psyche\, preventing it from being identified with her 
speaking self. The phrase itself, doing something περὶ ψυχῆς, is only found 
a few times before Aeschylus, but in each instance means “defending 
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91 The analysis here expands on Sommerstein 1989, ad loc.: “this plays on two senses 
of ψυχή. Normally, to speak or run or fight περὶ ψυχῆς meant to do so ‘for one’s life, with 
one’s life at stake’ (e.g., Il. 22.161; Od. 22.245; and Eur. Hel. 946) . . . only since (Clytem-
nestra) is dead, she has not been speaking ‘for my life’ but ‘for <the welfare of> my spirit’ 
(also ψυχή).” On the normal use of the term psyche\, etymologically connected with breath 
(Chantraine 1968–80, Beekes and Beek 2010), “only when there is a question of life and 
death,” see Burkert 1985, 195–6. Dindorf 1876, for example, categorizes this passage under 
“vita” along with Ag. 965 and Ag. 1465–7.
92 Her language never refers to funeral ritual or any of the possible salvation ritu-
als in the Greek world, such as the Eleusinian mysteries. For an attempt to find mystery 
vocabulary in the Or. see Thomson 1935. Sourvinou-Inwood 2003, 231–51, analyzes the 
rituals inside the Or. in relation to their religious context in the greater Dionysia festival, 
but counterpoises the fact that this trilogy emphasizes human relationships more than 
previous tragedies, which she terms “religious.”
93 Johnston 1999, 7–32, lays out the evidence for the increasing influence of the 
dead from relatively weak in Homer to active in the world in tragedy, covering the extant 
examples of ghostly demands in literature. Bardel 2005, 92, argues, from later evidence, that 
Aeschylus was the first to bring eido\la onstage. This is not to claim that our extant sources 
are the only literary ghosts to which the Athenian audience had ever been exposed. For 
example, Aeschylus’ fragmentary Psychagogoi (“Ghost-Raisers”), of uncertain date, is con-
nected with the Odyssey’s journey to the underworld; cf. Henrichs 1991, 187–92; Moreno 
2004, 7–29; Cousin 2005, 137–52, who compares the fragments to the Homeric Nekyia, 
other Aeschylean scenes, and vase-painting; Bardel 2005, 85–92; and Sommerstein 2008c, 
269–73, and 2010, 249–50. 
one’s life from death.”91 Needless to say, this gloss is utterly incongruous 
in the current context: the dead Clytemnestra no longer has any life to 
save. Aeschylus, through this poetic paradox, forces his audiences to seek 
a different interpretation. 
Consideration of the concerns of Homeric ghosts suggests that, 
although they never explicitly declare it, they could be thought of as 
speaking “on account of” or “for the benefit of” their psyche\, in the sense 
of improving their soul’s condition in the afterlife. This interpretation rests 
on the demand of the Ghost of Patroclus and the Ghost of Elpenor for 
ritual burial, which would provide their psychai entry into the realm of 
Hades. As a basis for her claims, the Ghost of Clytemnestra does appeal 
to the cultural mores of obligation to the dead. Yet through her unpar-
alleled use of περὶ ψυχῆς she demands the spilling of kindred blood for 
“the benefit of her soul.”92 Unlike the Homeric ghosts, then, the Ghost 
of Clytemnestra returns to provoke a cultural transgression. She thus 
undercuts the positive societal functions of ritual, instead twisting the 
claims of the dead against the living. In extant epic and tragic literature, 
she is the first Ghost to directly demand her own vengeance.93 
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94 Sourvinou-Inwood 2003, 223–7, explores the gulf between what the audience 
would have seen as the foolhardy behavior of Darius while alive and the wisdom of his 
Ghost, which an audience could interpret as the result of his change of status after death 
and nearness to the divine.
95 Muntz 2011, 257–71, analyzes the raising scene as a mixture between a necromantic 
ritual and the worship of Darius as divine. 
Aeschylus’ treatment of two other dead rulers serves to clarify the 
point concerning Clytemnestra’s desired change of status in the afterlife. 
First, a contrast with the Persians: in the earliest extant Aeschylean ghost 
scene, King Darius is actively raised by others in a ritual, speaks for him-
self, and emphasizes his honor in the underworld (Pers. 607–842). The 
Ghost of Darius is, in fact, called a psyche\ (ψυχήν, 630). He does interact 
with the living world by repeatedly demonstrating concern about the 
Persian state (e.g., πόλις, 682) and his son (e.g., 739–51). He even imparts 
insight to the elders about the change of values at death, sententiously 
advising them (and thus the theatrical audience) to “give pleasure to 
your soul” (ψυχῇ διδόντες ἡδονήν, 841) because wealth is of no use to the 
dead (τοῖς θανοῦσι, 842).94 Nevertheless, he does not ask anyone to act on 
his behalf—pointedly, he does not seek vengeance against the Greeks. 
Moreover, unlike the Ghosts of Patroclus, Elpenor, and Clytemnestra, 
the Ghost of Darius does not demand any action that might affect his 
underworld state. He does not need to: he himself declares his power in 
the underworld (688–92) and the language and rituals in the scene attest 
to his honor above.95 This provides a stark antithesis to the afterlife dis-
honor and powerlessness of which the Ghost of Clytemnestra complains 
and the benefit she seeks through vengeance.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from Darius, two previous 
scenes of the Oresteia—both related to the murdered Agamemnon—
contain themes that parallel the Ghost of Clytemnestra’s concern. The 
first, following the king’s killing, demonstrates the robust link in the 
Oresteia’s language between proper ritual and actual benefit to the psyche\ 
(Ag. 1543–6): 
ἦ σὺ τόδ᾽ ἔρξαι τλήσῃ, κτείνασ᾽
ἄνδρα τὸν αὑτῆς ἀποκωκῦσαι
ψυχῇ τ᾽ ἄχαριν χάριν ἀντ᾽ ἔργων
μεγάλων ἀδίκως ἐπικρᾶναι; 
Chor.: Will you dare to do this: having slain your own husband, 
to bewail him and unjustly perform a graceless grace for his soul
in return for his great accomplishments?
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96 Hame 2004, esp. 524–7, clarifies the precise nature of Agamemnon’s dishonored 
burial by demonstrating that at each stage Clytemnestra has subverted traditional Greek 
ritual; cf. Seaford 1984.
97 McClure 1999, 70–1, points out that Clytemnestra uses almost no ritual language—
particularly striking is her lack of lamentation. 
98 The Chorus, in Ch. 354–62, describe Agamemnon as sitting on a throne in the 
underworld among the glorious war dead, but leave it grammatically unclear whether they 
are claiming this is his actual state, or merely potentially the case if he is avenged. On the 
grammatical point, see Garvie 1986, ad loc. On ἐμασχαλίσθη, see Dunn 2018. 
99 Zeitlin 1965, 496, suggests that the Chorus here attempts to rouse sufficient fury in 
Orestes to kill his mother. In this they would be acting similarly to Clytemnestra’s Ghost 
goading the Erinyes; cf. Rosenmeyer 1982, 163–73; Deforge 1986, 276–7; McCall 1990, 21–7; 
Bacon 2001, 52–3; and Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012, 306 n. 1120.
The Argive Elders deny that Clytemnestra can properly perform the 
burial rites for Agamemnon, having murdered him. While their main 
emphasis is on Clytemnestra’s unholy actions, the oxymoron “graceless 
grace” (ἄχαριν χάριν, 1545) demonstrates that the Chorus intend for the 
“grace” (χάριν) of ritual lamentation to benefit the psyche\ (ψυχῇ) of 
Agamemnon. That is, although the Elders use a phrase (ψυχῇ . . . χάριν) 
synonymous to the Ghost of Clytemnestra’s later περὶ ψυχῆς, they clearly 
refer to ritual, rather than to vengeance on his behalf. 
The second relevant example from the Oresteia responds to the 
abased burial that Clytemnestra proceeds to give Agamemnon.96 The 
Chorus of Slave Women, Orestes, and Electra in the kommos scene of 
the Choephoroi (306–513) restore to Agamemnon his lost ritual lam-
entation, but also attempt to go far beyond.97 They endeavor to raise 
Agamemnon from the dead (e.g., Ch. 315–22, 456, and 459) or gain 
his power (e.g., 244–5, 479–80, and 490). The Slave Women, moreover, 
accentuate the divide between what ought be Agamemnon’s position 
as a king honored in the underworld (354–62) and his actual burial as a 
mutilated (ἐμασχαλίσθη, 439) and dishonored (ἀτίμους, 443) corpse.98 They 
use this disparity to inflame his progeny to vengeance.99 The children in 
turn promise their father future household rituals for his help in killing 
Clytemnestra (483–8). The relationships to dead Agamemnon that the 
Chorus and his children create rely on vengeance in the living world 
to alter Agamemnon’s fate after death. Every character in the scene 
appears to accept that kin-killing, and not merely the correct rituals for 
Agamemnon, can effect the change of status they desire for his afterlife. 
The afterlife benefit the Ghost of Clytemnestra seeks by having Orestes 
killed mirrors the benefit to Agamemnon’s afterlife that the mourners 
previously used to justify killing her. 
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100 In the Ch. Agamemnon regains his cultic honors from his household (Ch. 483–8). 
Redemptions of Clytemnestra begin already with Euripides, including Helen sending liba-
tions to her grave in the Orestes. On the changing receptions of Clytemnestra, see Hall 2005.
101 At the end of the Ag., for example, Clytemnestra acts to mollify further conflicts, 
shifting the representation of her character; cf. Foley 2001, 228–9.
The Ghost of Clytemnestra epitomizes the “old justice” of unending 
vengeance, even from beyond the grave. She disregards entirely the social 
aspect of ritual closure, evident in the Elders’ concern for civic mourning 
in the Agamemnon and the more private concern for household mourn-
ing in the Choephoroi. Instead, the Ghost of Clytemnestra focuses on 
murderous acts, ignores civic or familial obligations, and never mentions 
a desire for ritual lamentation. The reasons she proffers for vengeance, 
in their focus on her pain and dishonor, also differ from the universal 
claims the Erinyes make in Orestes’ trial, ostensibly on her behalf. She 
is acting for personal ends, for her own psyche\. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE ETHICAL CLAIMS OF  
A CHARACTER BEYOND HUMAN LIMITS
How can the Ghost of Clytemnestra be understood as a challenge to 
ethical thought? At every turn, the dead queen undercuts the bases of 
normative ethics, tearing at the social fabric with her claims and actions. 
The Ghost of Clytemnestra stands out from previous undead figures in 
Homer and tragedy by explicitly seeking a change in her afterlife honor 
based not on ritual but on vengeance. Unlike them, also, her living char-
acter has already been condemned ethically as a murderer, kin-killer, 
and liar. The living queen deceived through language, took control of 
the house, and violently subverted the state. For this she was killed by 
her own children. That is, in part her own actions and in part her murder 
by family severed the bonds required for ritual burial, with its positive 
effects of memory, social reintegration, and a certain sense of closure. Yet 
despite these seemingly irredeemable issues with her living character, her 
post-mortem fate could have unrolled differently. She could have never 
appeared at all and become whitewashed over time, like Agamemnon, 
who—despite his murderous transgression against his household—does 
eventually receive familial lament and honors.100 Even as a Ghost, she 
could have returned from the underworld reformed, chastised by punish-
ment, or only demanding proper ritual.101 Yet the Ghost of Clytemnestra 
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102 The living Clytemnestra’s linguistic potency shares many features with feminine 
forces marked as monstrous and disruptive in myths of masculine, divine order, which are 
consequently suppressed, as Rabinowitz 1981 demonstrates comprehensively; cf. Zeitlin 1978.
103 Betensky 1978 rightly connects the dramatic force of the living Clytemnestra with 
her inventive language both within the play and for the theatrical audience. Cf. Pucci 1998, 
131, on Odysseus as narrator and fabricator of his own tale. 
104 Ringer 1998, ix–x and 8–12, argues that creative characters who act as directors, 
role play, and deceive are part of a suite of devices in Sophocles for breaking boundaries 
by calling attention to dramatic illusions and simultaneously creating connections for audi-
ences with their own cultural background (e.g., with the contemporary polis, the theater, 
and the festival setting). 
rises implacable, raging about her dishonor, and calling for kindred blood. 
Her reappearance as a ghost thus pushes the social problems inherent 
in the living Clytemnestra’s self-centered actions to their logical limits. 
The Ghost’s exceptional challenge is only intensified by her problem-
atic arguments. The emphasis on her status as a dream leads to questions 
about how far her body can be denatured before her arguments from physi-
cal wounds become insubstantial as well. Exactly at those points when she 
seems to engage emotion most immediately—wounds seen in the heart, 
underworld shame as an unavenged mother—her language reveals the 
shifting nature of its referents. Each key phrase the Ghost utters disinte-
grates its presumed signified: her wounds are not wounds, her disgrace is 
not punishment for her acts, and her afterlife depiction fits no one else’s in 
the trilogy. Controlling the narrative and eluding all mores frees the Ghost 
of Clytemnestra to reinterpret her “shame” and “dishonor” in the afterlife, 
not as punishments for her transgressions, but as reproaches against the 
Erinyes themselves. Her story of the afterlife and continuing rhetorical 
mastery enable her to warp even these sufferings into markers of an ethi-
cal imbalance in duty that must be corrected in her favor. 
The living queen, bereft of political and physical power, had to rely 
on language to weave an entrapping web and overturn the social order.102 
While repugnant for her actions, her dramatic and rhetorical mastery 
captivated audiences internal and external.103 As a Ghost, Clytemnestra 
is again innovative with her oratory, even depicting a similar underworld 
scenario to the one the living queen created for Agamemnon. Clytem-
nestra, when living, wrote her own play, carefully scripting the return of 
Agamemnon to include an act of impiety and to culminate in her long-
planned vengeance. Analogously, her Ghost breaks the frame of the 
drama:104 she metatheatrically directs the action onstage by rousing the 
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105 Cioffi 2015 suggestively likens Clytemnestra’s Ghost to a chorus leader, even to a 
choregos directing the Erinyes, which hints at metatheatrical possibilities from a different 
angle; cf. Vogel-Ehrensperger 2012, 303–8.
106 Brown 1983, 34, sees the whole Eu. as changing the terms of the debate from the 
previous human cycle of retribution to a wholly divine issue, only resolved by conversion 
of the Erinyes; cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007, 79–109.
107 Foley 2001, 201–34, demonstrates that, even though the living Clytemnestra justi-
fies herself and demands to be treated comparably to male autonomous agents, judgment 
in the Or. always ends up being given along gendered lines; cf. Winnington-Ingram 1948; 
McClure 1999, 70–92; and Zeitlin 1965, 589–93. 
108 See Easterling 1973, 3–7, on stage-presence and entanglement in relatable human 
dilemmas as criteria for emotionally credible characters in tragedy, with specific reference 
to the Or.
109 Zeitlin 1990, 68–9, condenses the problems that women pose in Greek cultural 
representations, especially tragedy, as always a radical Other in a male dominated society, 
never an end in themselves, which their deaths display; cf. Loraux 1987, 1–3.
Chorus.105 She flickers with self-awareness, with an understanding that she 
is a dream and knowledge of another, invisible dream. The living Cly-
temnestra masterfully manipulated language; the Ghost of Clytemnestra 
extends this rhetorical mastery to the image of herself, to her depiction 
of life beyond death, and to her allusions to the theatrical illusion.
Throughout, Clytemnestra has no divine support, no prophet, oracle, 
or command from the gods as Agamemnon and Orestes have. Even her 
champions, the Erinyes, who at first take her ethical claims seriously, even-
tually abandon her. They shift to themselves the vocabulary of reproach 
and honor that the Ghost uses. They generalize Clytemnestra’s claims 
and disavow her singularity. Despite their corrupt femininity, despite 
their connection with blood and punishment that made them abhor-
rent, they gain honor from Athena.106 It becomes evident over the rest 
of the Eumenides—as the other characters mute Clytemnestra’s name 
and undercut her role as mother and queen—that the new social system 
and justice of Athena is meant to suppress Clytemnestra.107 Within the 
context of the trilogy as a whole, Clytemnestra’s claims are compromised 
and then forsaken.
It is precisely the abandonment by all humans and divinities that 
the Ghost complains of, and, through force of personality, returns from 
the dead to resist. In asking to right a wrong done to an individual, the 
Ghost reengages the living Clytemnestra’s multidimensional character.108 
For the living queen was not, by any means, a flat villain, but challenged 
a system that oppressed women and killed her daughter.109 To recognize 
the full power of Clytemnestra’s tragic personality is to see that she keeps 
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110 Vellacott 1984b, 62–75, among others, claims Clytemnestra is the real “tragic hero-
ine” of the Or.; cf. Anderson 1929 and Winnington-Ingram 1948. Schelling, whose influential 
writings may be the first modern philosophy of tragedy, emphasizes the fight against fate 
as the true emblem of the tragic hero’s freedom, despite his being marked as a criminal 
and punished by this same fate (Szondi 2002, 7–10).
111 Κλυταιμήστρα καλῶ, Eu. 116; cf. προυννέπω, Eu. 98. The Ghost’s speech thus reso-
nates with Clytemnestra’s transgressive public discourse in the Ag., which has drawn much 
critical attention, see Zeitlin 1965, 481–3; McClure 1999, 70–80; Loraux 1987, 1–3, 21, and 
26–7; and Foley 2001, 207–9. 
112 Nagy 2010, 37, theorizes one way of connecting the theatrical actor to a notion 
of outreach to the dramatic audience: “Just as subjectivity can be analyzed in terms of the 
person in grammar, it can also be analyzed in terms of the persona in theater . . . in Greek, 
the noun πρόσωπον (proso\pon) likewise means ‘theatrical mask’ . . . a subjective agent, an 
‘I’ who is looking for a dialogue with a ‘you’” (emphasis original). 
113 Altieri 1998 focuses on the “lyrical I” that cries out of literary texts and calls for 
ethical engagement. Critiquing Nussbaum and others who use literature to either establish 
ethical generalizations or supplement them, he rightly claims that listening to characters in 
literature encourages thinking through complexities lacking in such universalizing theories. 
114 The Ghost of Clytemnestra is thus ethically significant in complementary ways to 
later tragic female characters who have drawn much attention for breaking social  barriers, 
fighting the lost fight, even after death.110 The Ghost of Clytemnestra 
names herself and calls out, implicating internal and external audiences.111 
When she narrates her experience in the underworld with the first-person 
singular, the Ghost makes a personal entreaty. Despite the compromised 
nature of her words, she insists that her hearers “listen” in all seriousness, 
since she is “speaking for her very soul.” 
By the very act of locution dramatic characters demand ethical 
respect for their hypostasis. Some have declared it a fundamental of 
drama, the imperative to count the persona, proso\pon, mask, or charac-
ter, as a person, not merely as a means to further plot, dramatic tension, 
or an idea.112 Direct address fuses the necessity to attend to the ethical 
claims of the living Clytemnestra with her story of continuation in the 
afterlife, narrated in a dream. In speaking, the Ghost awakens not only 
the sleeping Erinyes but anyone who hears.113 The Ghost’s words thus 
implicate each individual audience member in the (over)heard com-
mand to listen, to “see,” to imagine in one’s heart. Clytemnestra—dead, 
dreamt—is calling out to us. 
Although the Oresteia stands so early in the Western theatrical 
tradition, its Ghost scene forces a continual reconsideration of a dra-
matic character and her speaking acts. As a formerly living human who 
now lacks substance, yet has speaking presence, who must motivate 
through argument, image, and story-telling, the Ghost darkly illuminates 
tragedy’s ability to raise serious ethical issues.114 The Ghost eloquently 
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such as Antigone, who has credibility as a moral actor, and Medea, who has enough magi-
cal power to destroy and escape punishment; see, e.g., Foley 2001, 172–200 and 243–71.
115 This article benefited greatly from the feedback of colleagues, teachers, and oth-
ers who commented so thoughtfully on earlier drafts, including the editor and readers at 
AJP. My gratitude especially goes to Nancy Felson, whose critical intelligence combines 
with extraordinary generosity. 
demands respect for herself, even after death, a respect the drama itself 
finally withdraws from her. Yet she represents a nexus of challenges to 
ethically normative theories and notions of virtuous actors. Through her, 
an audience confronts the possibility that human ethical claims may be 
valid even for a transgressor against the state, destroyer of family, and 
shameless deceiver, even as spoken by a character who is dead, who 
is harassed in the afterlife, and who speaks within a dream of demons. 
The Ghost of Clytemnestra’s key provocation is in the tension between 
the estrangement she causes and the pull of her ethical appeals: she is 
spectral, guilty, yet human.115
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